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Secure Platooning of Autonomous Vehicles
Under Attacked GPS Data
Xingkang He, Ehsan Hashemi, Karl H. Johansson
Abstract— In this paper, we study how to secure the pla-
tooning of autonomous vehicles when an unknown vehicle is
under attack and bounded system uncertainties exist. For the
attacked vehicle, its position and speed measurements from
GPS can be manipulated arbitrarily by a malicious attacker.
First, to find out which vehicle is under attack, two detectors
are proposed by using the relative measurements (by camera or
radar) and the local innovation obtained through measurements
from neighboring vehicles. Then, based on the results of the
detectors, we design a local state observer for each vehicle by
applying a saturation method to the measurement innovation.
Moreover, based on the neighbor state estimates provided by
the observer, a distributed controller is proposed to achieve
the consensus in vehicle speed and keep fixed desired distance
between two neighboring vehicles. The estimation error by the
observer and the platooning error by the controller are shown to
be asymptotically upper bounded under certain conditions.The
effectiveness of the proposed methods is also evaluated in
numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The potential to enable fast and reconfigurable mecha-
nisms for increasingly prevalent Automated Driving Systems
(ADS), cooperative intelligent transportation systems (C-
ITS), and vehicle platooning, as well as compelling mobility
and safety benefits, underscores the critical need to develop
more reliable and secure distributed-system designs in intelli-
gent transport. In vehicle platooning and cooperative adaptive
cruise controls (CACC), estimating the current vehicle states
, which are shared via communication between vehicles, is
essential for stability and traction control, as well as motion
planning [1]–[4]. Vehicle (longitudinal and lateral) speeds
can be measured by a GPS, but their reliability due to loss
of reception and the poor accuracy of available commercial
GPSs, specifically in measuring sideslip (and lateral speed),
necessitates developing a reliable state estimators in con-
nected ADS that share measurements and local estimates
over Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) or 5G
NR access via 3GPP PC5 or IEEE 802.11 technologies.
Vehicle platooning has enhanced in recent years in terms
of reliability through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) connectivity,
distributed state estimation, and learning-aided controls [5]–
[7]. However, the existing secure platooning solutions in C-
ITS are prohibitively inefficient in dealing with malicious
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attacks on GPS measurements. Such attacks could be through
transmission of the received GPS data (in data acquisition
modules) to ADS’ control systems or the GPS receiver. Thus,
reliable state estimation, resilient to attacks and robust to
system uncertainties, plays key roles in ensuring the safety
of intelligent transport by improving the reliability of vehicle
local active safety systems and enhancing the performance in
cooperative tasks such as CACC [8], [9]. Real-time methods
are proposed in [10], [11] to diagnose jamming Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks in IEEE 802.11p vehicular networks
and its false alarm probabilities are estimated. A data-driven
fault detection approach and a decision support system are
proposed in [12] to diagnose attacks and track fault data
injection attacks in CACC (in real time).
To mitigate the DoS attack in CACC, a set of linear
Luenberger observers is designed in [13] by using LMI
over delayed measurements to develop a resilient control
strategy. An adaptive control strategy is designed in [14]
to deal with time-invariant sensor and actuator attacks in
a vehicular network, with wireless V2V communication,
while guaranteeing uniform boundedness of the closed-loop
system. A decentralized proportional-derivative controller
augmented by a triggering mechanism for getting preceding
vehicles’ new measurements is designed in [15] to maintain
string stability in a vehicular platoon. A trust-based ser-
vice recommendation scheme is proposed in [16] to avoid
selecting badly behaved head vehicles for ballot-stuffing
and onoff attacks in vehicular ad hoc networks. In [17],
[18] cooperative control protocols and state observers are
provided for enhancing resilience to attacks and detecting
faults in vehicular platoons.
To this end, by using available secure radar and stereo
camera, which are available in autonomous vehicles, ADS,
and advanced driver-assistance systems, and the potentially
attacked GPS data in an unknown vehicle, this paper studies
how to design a secure algorithm such that a group of
autonomous vehicles achieve practical platooning. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized in the following.
1) To find out which vehicle is under attack, we propose
two detectors by using the relative measurements and
the local innovation obtained through the absolute and
relative measurements of three neighboring vehicles,
respectively. Then, based on the results of the detec-
tors, we design a local state observer for each vehicle
by applying a saturation method to the measurement
innovation.
2) Based on the neighbor state estimates provided by the
observer, we design a distributed controller to achieve
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consensus in vehicle speed and keeping fixed desired
distance between two neighboring vehicles. It is also
shown that the estimation error (by the observer) and
the platooning error are asymptotically upper bounded
under certain conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II is on the problem formulation. Section III provides the
secure platooning algorithm, whose performance is studied
in Section IV. After numerical simulations in Section V, the
paper is concluded in Section VI. The main proofs are given
in Appendix.
A. Notations
The superscript “T” represents the transpose. Rn×m is
the set of real matrices with n rows and m columns. Rn
is the n-dimensional Euclidean space. In stands for the n-
dimensional square identity matrix. diag{·} represents the
diagonalization operator. A⊗B is the Kronecker product of
A and B. ‖x‖ is the 2-norm of a vector x. ‖A‖ is the induced
2-norm, i.e., ‖A‖ = sup
x 6=0
‖Ax‖
‖x‖ . λmin(A) and λmax(A) are the
minimal and maximal eigenvalues of a real-valued symmetric
matrix A, respectively. Ii∈C stands for the indicator function,
which equals 1 if i ∈ C, and 0 otherwise.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System model
Considering N ≥ 3 vehicles, without loss of generality,
we assume that the order of these vehicles from the leader
to the tail is 1, 2, . . . , N . The leader vehicle, i.e., vehicle 1,
satisfies the following dynamics:
x1(t+ 1) = Ax1(t) + n1(t), (1)
and vehicle i, i = 2, 3, . . . , N , satisfies
xi(t+ 1) = Axi(t) + [0, Tui(t)]
T + ni(t), (2)
where xj(t) = [sj(t), vj(t)]T ∈ R2 is the state of vehicle j
consisting of position sj(t) and velocity vj(t), nj(t) ∈ R2
the process noise, ui(t) ∈ R the control input, A = ( 1 T0 1 ),
and T the sampling time, j = 1, 2, . . . , N .
Vehicle j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, obtains its position and veloc-
ity measurements from GPS:
yj,j(t) = xj(t) + aj(t) + dj,j(t) (3)
where yj,j(t) ∈ R2 and dj,j(t) ∈ R2 are the measurement
and measurement noise of vehicle j. aj(t) ∈ R2 is the attack
signal injected by a malicious attacker.
Moreover, by employing the vehicle sensors (e.g., radar
and camera), vehicle i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , N} is able to measure
the relative state between itself and its front vehicle (i.e.,
vehicle i− 1):
yi−1,i(t) = xi(t)− xi−1(t) + di−1,i(t), (4)
where yi−1,i(t) ∈ R2 and di−1,i(t) ∈ R2 are the measure-
ment and measurement noise. Note that in this paper we
assume the relative state measurements are attack-free.
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Fig. 1. Platoon model and communication topology of seven vehicles:
Each vehicle is able to measure the relative state between itself and its front
vehicle by radar or camera (i.e., yj,i, j ∈ N¯i). For two vehicles connected
by wireless communications (e.g., WIFI), they can exchange their absolute
and relative measurements (i.e., yi,i and yj,i, j ∈ N¯i), and the predicted
estimates of own states (i.e., x¯i(t)).
Assumption 1: On the noise processes in (1)–(4) and
the initial estimate xˆj(0), for j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and i ∈
{2, . . . , N}, it holds that
‖xˆj(0)− xj(0)‖ ≤ q,
‖nj(t)‖ ≤ ,
max{‖dj,j(t)‖ , ‖di−1,i(t)‖} ≤ µ,
where q, , and µ are positive real-valued scalars known to
each vehicle.
B. Attack model
Denote V = {1, 2, . . . , N}, A the label set of the attacked
vehicle, and Ac = V−A the label set of attack-free vehicles.
Assumption 2: There is an unknown vehicle j ∈ V under
attack, i.e., A = {j}, such that the attack signal ai(t) in (3)
satisfies
ai(t) ∈ R2, i = j,
ai(t) = 0, i 6= j.
From Assumption 2, the GPS measurements of the at-
tacked vehicle j can be manipulated arbitrarily. There is
tradeoff on the use of the measurements. On one hand, if
the measurements are fully trusted by conventional observers,
once the vehicle is under attack, the estimation performance
would be seriously degraded by the injected attack signals.
On the other hand, if little confidence is given to the
measurements, the estimation performance would be also
degraded, since little information is utilized. Therefore, it
is worth studying how to employ the potentially attacked
measurements and how to design detectors to find out the
attacked vehicle.
C. Communication of vehicles
We denote N¯i the neighbor set of vehicle i, where N¯i =
{i − 1, i} if i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, N¯1 = {2, 3}, and N¯N =
{N−2, N−1}. The communication topology of the vehicles
is illustrated in Fig. 1 with N = 7, where each vehicle
i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, can receive the measurements of its
neighboring vehicle j, j ∈ N¯i, including both absolute and
relative measurements in (3) and (4). Note that for the leader
and tail vehicles, i.e., vehicle 1 and vehicle N , to ensure the
redundancy of measurement information against the possible
attacks on them, we require that vehicle 1 can obtain the
measurements from vehicles 2 and 3, and that vehicle N can
obtain the measurements from vehicles N − 1 and N − 2.
Problem: We aim to design the control input ui(t) for
vehicles i, 2 ≤ i ≤ N, such that their speeds are close to the
speed of the leader vehicle 1 and two neighboring vehicles
keep a certain distance in position, i.e.,
lim sup
t→∞
|vi(t)− v1(t))| ≤ γ1,
lim sup
t→∞
|si(t)− si−1(t)−∆i,i−1| ≤ γ2,
(5)
against the attack signal {ai(t), i ∈ A} injected by some
malicious attacker, where γ1 and γ2 are nonnegative real-
valued scalars, related to the system noise.
III. CO-DESIGN OF OBSERVER, DETECTOR, AND
CONTROLLER
In this section, for each vehicle i, i ∈ {2, . . . , N}, we will
first design a local state observer to estimate its velocity and
position, then develop two local attack detectors to find out
whether it is under attack, and finally provide a distributed
controller by employing the estimates from neighboring
vehicles to achieve the vehicle platooning in (5).
A. Observer design
By (27)–(29), the measurement equation for vehicle i, i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, can be written in the following:
zi(t) = Cxi(t) + ai(t) + di(t) (6)
where
z1(t) = [y
T
1,1(t), y
T
1|2(t), y
T
1|3(t)]
T ,
a1(t) = [a
T
1 (t), a
T
2 (t), a
T
3 (t)]
T ,
d1(t) = [d
T
1,1(t), d
T
1|2(t), d
T
1|3(t)]
T ,
zi(t) = [y
T
i|i−1(t), y
T
i,i(t), y
T
i|i+1(t)]
T , 2 ≤ i ≤ N − 1,
ai(t) = [a
T
i−1(t), a
T
i (t), a
T
i+1(t)]
T ,
di(t) = [d
T
i|i−1(t), d
T
i,i(t), d
T
i|i+1(t)]
T ,
zN (t) = [y
T
N |N−2(t), y
T
N |N−1(t), y
T
N,N (t)]
T ,
aN (t) = [a
T
N−2(t), a
T
N−1(t), a
T
N (t)]
T ,
dN (t) = [d
T
N |N−2(t), d
T
N |N−1(t), d
T
N,N (t)]
T ,
C =
I2×2I2×2
I2×2
 ,
(7)
where the notations in (7) are given in Appendix A. Note that
yi|j , j = i− 1, i+ 1 stands for the absolute measurement of
vehicle i calculated with the relative measurement between
vehicles i and j.
Since the leader vehicle is control-free, i.e., u1(t) = 0,
from (1), (2), and (6), we have the reformulated state equa-
tion and measurement equation of vehicle i, i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
in the following
xi(t+ 1) = Axi(t) + [0, Tui(t)]
T + ni(t)
zi(t) = Cxi(t) + ai(t) + di(t).
(8)
We aim to design an observer for vehicle i with two steps,
namely, time update and measurement update. In the time
update, for vehicle i, we let
x¯i(t) = Axˆi(t− 1) + [0, Tui(t− 1)]T , (9)
where xˆi(t) is the estimate of xi(t). Then we denote the
measurement innovation of vehicle i at time t by ηi(t), where
ηi(t) = zi(t)− Cx¯i(t). (10)
To number the labels of vehicles in the measurement
update equation, we let
ηi(t) =:
(
η
[1]
i,j1
(t) η
[2]
i,j1
(t) η
[1]
i,j2
(t) η
[2]
i,j2
(t) η
[1]
i,j3
(t) η
[2]
i,j3
(t)
)
Ki(t) =: diag{k[1]i,j1(t), k
[2]
i,j1
(t), k
[1]
i,j2
(t), k
[2]
i,j2
(t), (11)
k
[1]
i,j3
(t), k
[2]
i,j3
(t)},
where j1, j2, j3 ∈ N¯i ∪{i}. For example, from equation (6),
if i = 1, j1 = 1, j2 = 2, j3 = 3, and if i = N , j1 =
N − 2, j2 = N − 1, j3 = N , otherwise, j1 = i − 1, j2 =
i, j3 = i + 1. Then we design a saturation-like scheme to
utilize the measurement ηi(t) as follows.
For each m = {1, 2, 3}, and for each r = {1, 2},
k
[r]
i,jm
(t) =
1, if |η
[r]
i,jm
(t)| ≤ β,
β
|η[r]i,jm (t)|
, otherwise, (12)
where β ≥ 0 is a saturation parameter to be designed in the
following. From equations (11) and (12), the update equation
is given:
xˆi(t) = x¯i(t) +
1
2
CTKi(t)ηi(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (13)
B. Detector design
Although the saturation based estimation method provided
in the previous subsection can be employed directly to
estimate vehicle state (position and speed), under potentially
attacked GPS measurements, an attack detection protocol is
provided in the following to identify the vehicle under attack.
When the attacked vehicle is identified, we provide an attack-
free estimation approach by isolating the measurements of
the attacked vehicle to improve the estimation performance.
The idea of the first detector is that for two attack-free
vehicles, the norm of the difference between the relative mea-
surements and the absolute measurements is upper bounded
by a scalar related to the noise bound. Otherwise, one of the
two vehicles is under attack.
Lemma 1: For each attack-free vehicle i ≥ 2 and i − 1,
i.e., i ∈ {2, . . . , N} ∩ Ac, if Assumption 1 holds,
‖fi,i−1(t)‖ ≤ 3µ,
where fi,i−1(t) = yi−1,i(t) + yi−1(t)− yi(t).
Proof: By equation (3), for i ∈ {2, . . . , N} ∩ Ac,
yi,i(t) = xi(t) + di,i(t)
yi−1,i−1(t) = xi−1(t) + di−1,i−1(t).
(14)
From equation (4),
yi−1,i(t) = xi(t)− xi−1(t) + di−1,i(t). (15)
Then substituting (14) into (15) yields
fi,i−1(t) = di−1,i(t) + di−1,i−1(t) + di,i(t). (16)
Taking the norm of both sides of (16) leads to the conclusion.
Let Γi(t) be the detected set of the attacked vehicle by
vehicle i at time t, which contains the label of the attacked
vehicle. Let Θi(t) be the detected-with-doubt vehicle set at
time t by vehicle i, which contains the labels of two vehicles
and one of them is the attacked vehicle. At the initial time,
we assume Γi(0) = ∅, and Θi(0) = ∅, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
The sets Γi(t) and Θi(t) are shared between neighboring
vehicles. From Lemma 1, we propose the following detector
to identify the attacked vehicle.
Detector 1: For vehicle i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}, test the
inequalities in 1) and 2); for vehicle i = 1, test the inequality
in 2); for vehicle i = N , test the inequality in 1):
1) ‖fi,i−1(t)‖ > 3µ
2) ‖fi+1,i(t)‖ > 3µ
then
• if there is a time t such that 1) holds, either vehicle i
or i− 1 is under attack, and we let Θi(t) = {i− 1, i};
• if there is a time t such that 2) holds, either vehicle i
or i+ 1 is under attack, and we let Θi(t) = {i, i+ 1};
• if there are two times under which 1) and 2) hold
respectively, then vehicle i is claimed to be under attack
and we let Γi(t) = {i};
Proposition 1: Under Assumptions 1–2, for Detector 1,
all the three claims hold.
Proof: From Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, the first and
second claims hold. Furthermore, under Assumption 2, the
third claim holds.
The idea of the second detector is that for an attack-free
vehicle, its measurement innovation is upper bounded by
a sequence related to the estimation error. Otherwise, this
vehicle is under attack. Define the sequence {ρ(t)} in the
following
ρ(t+ 1) = (1− k(t+ 1)) ‖A‖ ρ(t) +Q, (17)
where ρ(0) = q, and
k(t+ 1) = min{1, β‖A‖ ρ(t) + + µ},
Q =
3
2
(+ µ) +
√
2
2
β.
(18)
Lemma 2: Under Assumption 1, for each vehicle i ∈
{1, . . . , N},
• ‖xˆi(t)− x(t)‖ ≤ ρ(t);
• if vehicle i is attack-free, i.e., i ∈ Ac, then for t ≥ 1,
‖yi,i(t)−Axˆi(t− 1)‖ ≤ ‖A‖ ρ(t− 1) + + µ.
where ρ(t) is in (17).
Proof: See Appendix.
Based on Lemma 2, we provide the following detector.
Detector 2: We claim vehicle i is under attack and let
Γi(t) = {i}, if
‖yi,i(t)−Axˆi(t− 1)‖ > ‖A‖ ρ(t− 1) + + µ,
where ρ(t− 1) is in (17).
If the attacked vehicle, e.g., vehicle s ∈ Γi, is found out
by Detector 2, or two potentially attacked vehicles are found
out by Detector 1, e.g., vehicles l, l + 1 ∈ Θi(t), to remove
the influence of the measurements of vehicle s or vehicles
l, l + 1 to the estimation performance, the observer gains
Ki(t)
N
i=1 of all the vehicles are supposed to be adjusted as
follows. Recall the form of Ki(t) in (11):
Ki(t) =: diag{k[1]i,j1(t), k
[2]
i,j1
(t), k
[1]
i,j2
(t), k
[2]
i,j2
(t), (19)
k
[1]
i,j3
(t), k
[2]
i,j3
(t)}.
Then we provide the design of the elements k[r]i,jm(t), r =
1, 2, and m = 1, 2, 3 in the following.
If Γi(t) = {s}, let
k
[1]
i,s(t) = 0, k
[2]
i,s(t) = 0,∀s ∈ Nˆi,
k
[1]
i,l (t) = 1, k
[2]
i,l (t) = 1, l 6= s, l ∈ Nˆi,
(20)
where Nˆi = N¯i ∪ {i}.
If Γi(t) = ∅ but Θi(t) 6= ∅, let
k
[1]
i,s(t) = 0, k
[2]
i,s(t) = 0,∀s ∈ Nˆi ∩Θi(t),
k
[1]
i,l (t) = 1, k
[2]
i,l (t) = 1, l 6= s, l ∈ Nˆi.
(21)
In other cases, the design of Ki(t) remains the same as
equation (12), i.e., for each m = {1, 2, 3}, and for each
r = {1, 2},
k
[r]
i,jm
(t) =
1, if |η
[r]
i,jm
(t)| ≤ β,
β
|η[r]i,jm (t)|
, otherwise. (22)
Based on the designed Ki(t), all the measurements of the
attack-free vehicles will not be saturated and the measure-
ments of the possible attacked vehicles (e.g., the detected
vehicles) will no longer be employed.
C. Controller design
Next, we aim to design the control input based on the
neighbor estimates and the desired relative position distance
between two neighboring vehicles. Denote Ni the set of
vehicle(s) nearest to vehicle i, i.e.,
Ni =

{i− 1, i+ 1}, if i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , N − 1}
{2}, if i = 1
{N − 1}, if i = N.
(23)
Note that Ni ⊂ N¯i, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
Assume sˆi(t) and vˆi(t) are the estimates of si(t) and vi(t),
respectively. Let t∗i be the start time for the control input.
For 0 ≤ t < t∗i , we let ui(t) = 0. Regarding the acceleration
ui(t) in (9), by employing the predicted estimates x¯j(t) =
[s¯j(t), v¯j(t)]
T from the vehicle j ∈ Ni, vehicle i is equipped
with the following acceleration input, for t ≥ t∗i ≥ 0,
ui(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
(
gs(s¯j(t)− sˆi(t) + ∆i,j)
+ gv(v¯j(t)− vˆi(t))
)
, 2 ≤ i ≤ N,
(24)
where gs and gv are positive scalars to be determined. Note
that if the initial estimates are very accurate, we can choose
t∗i = 0. Otherwise, setting a larger t
∗ can lead to better
estimates but need more time to achieve the platooning of
vehicles.
Based on the observer, the two detectors and the dis-
tributed controller, for the system (8), we propose the secure
platooning algorithm for vehicle i in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Secure Autonomous Vehicle Platooning:
1: Initial setting: (x¯i(0), β, gs, gv)
2: Communications between neighboring vehicles: Ve-
hicle i sends out its measurements yi−1,i(t), yi,i(t), the
sets Θi(t−1) and Γi(t−1), and the estimate x¯i(t) to its
neighboring vehicle j ∈ N¯i. Let Γi(t) = ∪j∈N¯iΓj(t −
1)∪Γi(t− 1) and Θi(t) = ∪j∈N¯iΘj(t− 1)∪Θi(t− 1).
Then vehicle i runs Detector 1.
3: Measurement update: Vehicle i, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, uses
the measurement zi(t) in (6) to update its own state
estimate
ηi(t) = zi(t)− Cx¯i(t).
Run Detector 2 to update Θi(t) and Γi(t).
The estimate is updated in the following,
xˆi(t) = x¯i(t) +
1
2
CTKi(t)ηi(t),
where Ki(t) is designed by (19)–(22).
4: Control input: Vehicle i uses its own estimate xˆi(t) and
the predicted estimates x¯j(t), j ∈ Ni, from its neighbors
to design the input ui(t): ui(t) = 0, if 0 ≤ t ≤ t∗i ; for
t ≥ t∗i ,
ui(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
(
gs(s¯j(t)− sˆi(t) + ∆i,j)
+ gv(v¯j(t)− vˆi(t))
)
, 2 ≤ i ≤ N.
5: Time update:
x¯i(t+ 1) = Axˆi(t) + [0, Tui(t)]
T .
IV. ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE
In this section, we would like to study the performance
of Algorithm 1. First, we study the condition to ensure the
asymptotically bounded estimation error. Then, we provide
the design for the control parameters such that the platooning
error of vehicles are asymptotically bounded.
In the following theorem, we study the boundedness of
the estimation error for Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1: Consider the system (8) satisfying Assump-
tions 1–2, and Algorithm 1. If the following condition holds
(1− k∗) ‖A‖ q + 3
2
(+ µ) +
√
2
2
β < q, (25)
then the estimation error is uniformly upper bounded, i.e.,
lim sup
t→∞
‖xˆi(t)− xi(t)‖ ≤ α, i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where k∗ = min{1, β‖A‖q++µ}, and α is given in (31).
Proof: See Appendix.
We note that if , µ, T are sufficiently small, (25) is
satisfied by choosing β = p. The boundedness of the vehicle
platooning error is studied in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Under the same conditions as Theorem 1, if
λmax(Lg) < 4gs
g2v
, T <
gv
gs
(26)
then for i = 2, . . . , N , there exist constants γ1 and γ2 such
that
lim sup
t→∞
|vi(t)− v1(t))| ≤ γ1,
lim sup
t→∞
|si(t)− si−1(t) + ∆i,i−1| ≤ γ2.
Proof: See Appendix.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we study numerical simulations to show
the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in the vehicle
platooning under attacked GPS data.
Suppose there are five vehicles, in which the GPS mea-
surement data of vehicle 3 is compromised by a malicious
attacker. The attacker will insert the signal a3(t) = 2y˜3,3(t)),
where y˜3,3(t) is the attack-free GPS measurement of vehicle
3. We suppose the time interval t = [0, 1000] with sampling
step T = 1 second. Both the process noise ni(t) and
measurement noise di,j(t), j ∈ Ni ∪ {i}, i = 1, . . . , 5,
follow the uniform distribution between [−0.1, 0.1]. The
bounds in Assumption 1 are assumed to be µ = 0.1,  =
0.1, q = 100.5. The initial state is x1(0) = (100, 10)T ,
x2(0) = (60, 8)
T , x3(0) = (40, 6)
T , x4(0) = (20, 4)
T ,
x5(0) = (0, 2)
T , whose estimates are all 02×1. The required
distance between vehicles i and j ∈ Ni is ∆i,j = 20.
We conduct a Monto Carlo experiment with 100 runs.
Define the average estimation error in position and velocity
by ηi,s(t) and ηi,v(t), respectively, where
ηi,s(t) =
1
100
100∑
j=1
|eji,s(t)|,
ηi,v(t) =
1
100
100∑
j=1
|eji,v(t)|,
and eji,s(t) and e
j
i,v(t) are the state estimation errors of
vehicle i in position and velocity, respectively, at time t in
the jth run.
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Fig. 2. The conventional platooning of vehicles under attacks.
Moreover, we define the relative position and velocity
between vehicle i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} and the leader vehicle 1
by ζi,s(t) and ζi,v(t), respectively, where
ζi,s(t) =
1
100
100∑
j=1
(sji (t)− sj1(t)),
ζi,v(t) =
1
100
100∑
j=1
(vji (t)− vj1(t)),
and sji (t) and v
j
i (t) are the position and velocity of vehicle
i, respectively, at time t in the jth run.
First, we use a conventional algorithm, which has the same
controller as Algorithm 1 but all k[r]i,jm)(t) = 1, r = 1, 2,m =
1, 2, 3, i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} in the observer. For the case that the
GPS data of vehicle 3 is under attack, the simulation result
is given in Fig. 2. It shows that both the estimation error and
the platooning error show serious fluctuations. The average
crash number1 of the vehicles is 179. For Algorithm 1, we
choose gs = gv = 0.5, which satisfies the condition in (26).
The control input starts at time t∗i = 50. Also, we choose
β = 1. The simulation results are provided in Fig. 3 and Fig.
4. The attacked vehicle 3 is successfully detected at t = 2.
Fig. 3 shows that the estimation errors of all vehicles tend to
zero. In Fig. 4, the relative positions of vehicles are ensured
and all the velocities of the following vehicles tend to the
velocity of the leader vehicle 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper studied how to design a secure algorithm such
that a group of autonomous vehicles achieve platooning
under the case that the GPS data of one vehicle is under
attack. We provided a distributed algorithm, which consists
of a local state observer, two online attack detectors and a
distributed controller. The conditions to ensure bounded state
estimation error and vehicle platooning error were studied.
1The crash number is the times where the order from the leader vehicle
1 to the tail vehicle N is different from 1, 2, . . . , N .
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Fig. 3. Estimation error of vehicles by Algorithm 1.
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Fig. 4. Platooning of vehicles by Algorithm 1.
APPENDIX
A. Derivation of (6)
For vehicle i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , N−1}, by (3) and (4), we have
yi|i−1(t) = xi(t) + ai−1(t) + di|i−1(t)
yi|i+1(t) = xi(t) + ai+1(t) + di|i+1(t)
(27)
where
yi|i−1(t) = yi−1,i(t) + yi−1,i−1(t)
yi|i+1(t) = yi+1,i+1(t)− yi,i+1(t)
di|i−1(t) = di−1,i(t) + di−1,i−1(t)
di|i+1(t) = di+1,i+1(t)− di,i+1(t).
For vehicle 1,
y1|2(t) = x1(t) + a2(t) + d1|2(t)
y1|3(t) = x1(t) + a3(t) + d1|3(t)
(28)
where
y1|2(t) = y2,2(t)− y1,2(t)
y1|3(t) = y3,3(t)− y1,2(t)− y2,3(t)
d1|2(t) = d2,2(t)− d1,2(t)
d1|3(t) = d3,3(t)− d1,2(t)− d2,3(t).
For vehicle N ,
yN |N−1(t) = xN (t) + aN−1(t) + dN |N−1(t)
yN |N−2(t) = xN (t) + aN−2(t) + dN |N−2(t)
(29)
where
yN |N−1(t) = yN−1,N (t) + yN−1,N−1(t)
yN |N−2(t) = yN−1,N (t) + yN−2,N−1(t) + yN−2,N−2(t)
dN |N−1(t) = dN−1,N (t) + dN−1,N−1(t)
dN |N−2(t) = dN−1,N (t) + dN−2,N−1(t) + dN−2,N−2(t).
From (27)–(29), (6) is obtained.
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Let ei(t) = xˆi(t) − xi(t), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We use an
inductive method to prove the two conclusions. At the initial
time, under Assumption 1, ‖ei(0)‖ ≤ q. For an attack-free
vehicle i, by equations (1)–(3),
‖yi,i(1)−Axˆi(0)‖ = ‖−Aei(0) + ni(1) + di,i(1)‖
≤ ‖A‖ q + + µ.
Assume at time t− 1,
‖ei(t− 1)‖ ≤ ρ(t− 1)
‖yi,i(t)−Axˆi(t− 1)‖ ≤ ‖A‖ ρ(t− 1) + + µ.
Denote
K¯i,Ac(t) =: diag
{
k
[1]
i,j1
(t)Ij1∈Ac , k
[2]
i,j1
(t)Ij1∈Ac ,
k
[1]
i,j2
(t)Ij2∈Ac , k
[2]
i,j2
(t)Ij2∈Ac ,
k
[1]
i,j3
(t)Ij3∈Ac , k
[2]
i,j3
(t)Ij3∈Ac
}
∈ R6×6,
As we see, K¯i,Ac(t) is diagonal and its diagonal elements
are zero if the corresponding vehicles are under attack. Then
we define the complementary of K¯i,Ac(t) with respect to
K¯i(t):
K¯i,A(t) = K¯i(t)− K¯i,Ac(t).
Let K¯ [j]i (t) be the jth diagonal element of K¯i(t), j =
1, . . . , 6, and d[j]i (t) be the jth element of di(t). Denote
Kˆi(t) =

∑
j=1,3,5
K¯
[j]
i (t) 0
0
∑
j=2,4,6
K¯
[j]
i (t)
 ∈ R2×2
Wi(t) =
∑
j=1,3,5
(
K¯
[j]
i (t) 0
0 K¯
[j+1]
i (t)
)(
d
[j]
i (t)
d
[j+1]
i (t)
)
∈ R2.
By Algorithm 1, we have
ei(t) =Aei(t− 1) + 1
2
CT K¯i(t)(zi(t)− Cx¯i(t))
=(I2 − 1
2
Kˆi(t))Aei(t− 1) + 1
2
Kˆi(t)ni +
1
2
Wi(t)
+
1
2
CT K¯i,A(t)(zi(t)− Cx¯i(t)).
Taking the norm operation of ei(t) yields
‖ei(t)‖ ≤
∥∥∥∥(I2 − 12Kˆi(t))A
∥∥∥∥ ‖ei(t− 1)‖
+ |Ai,c|1
2
(+ µ) + |Ai|
√
2
1
2
β
≤
∥∥∥∥(I2 − 12Kˆi(t))A
∥∥∥∥ ‖ei(t− 1)‖+Q
≤(1− k(t)) ‖A‖ ρ(t− 1) +Q
=ρ(t). (30)
For an attack-free vehicle i, by equations (1)–(3),
‖yi,i(t+ 1)−Axˆi(t)‖ = ‖−Aei(t) + ni(t+ 1) + di,i(t+ 1)‖
≤ ‖A‖ ρ(t) + + µ.
C. Proof of Theorem 1
From Lemma 2, ‖xˆi(t)− xi(t)‖ ≤ ρ(t). The conclusion
of this theorem holds if lim sup
t→∞
ρ(t) ≤ α, which will be
proved in the following.
Let k∗ = min{1, β‖A‖q++µ}. Next, we prove ρ(t) < q
for t ≥ 1. From (18) and ρ(0) = q, k(1) ≥ k∗. By (17),
ρ(1) = (1− k(1)) ‖A‖ ρ(0) +Q ≤ (1− k∗) ‖A‖ q+Q < q.
Suppose at time t, ρ(t) < q. At time t + 1, from (18) and
k(t+ 1) > k∗. By (17), ρ(t+ 1) < (1− k∗) ‖A‖ q+Q < q.
Thus, ρ(t) < q for t ≥ 1.
Note that 0 < ‖(1− k∗)A‖ < 1, if (25) is satisfied and
k∗ 6= 1. As a result, for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we have
lim sup
t→∞
ρ(t)
≤α := Q
(
Ik∗=1 +
1
1− ‖(1− k∗)A‖ Ik∗ 6=1
)
, (31)
where Q = 32 (+ µ) +
√
2
2 β.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose x∗i (t) = [s
∗
i (t), v
∗
i (t)]
T is the desired state of
vehicle i. Denote the tracking error of vehicle i, 2 ≤ i ≤
N , by x˜i(t) = [s˜i(t), v˜i(t)]T which satisfies the following
equation
x˜i(t+ 1) = Ax˜i(t) + [0, T u˜i(t)]
T + δi(t) (32)
δi(t) = [0, T uˆi(t)]
T + ni(t) (33)
where
u˜i(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
(
gs(s˜j(t)− s˜i(t))
+ gv(v˜j(t)− v˜i(t))
)
, 2 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ N,
uˆi(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
(
gs((s¯j(t)− sj(t))− (sˆi(t)− si(t)))
+ gv((v¯j(t)− vj(t))− (vˆi(t)− vi(t))
)
(34)
Let X˜(t) = [x˜1(t)T , x˜2(t)T , . . . , x˜N (t)T ] and δ(t) =
[δ1(t)
T , δ2(t)
T , . . . , δN (t)
T ], then we have
X˜(t+ 1) = PX˜(t) + δ(t), (35)
where P = IN−1 ⊗ A − Lg ⊗ F , F =
(
0 0
Tgs Tgv
)
and
Lg is the ground Laplacian matrix with respect to the nodes
{2, 3, . . . , N} obtained by removing the first row and first
column of the Laplacian matrix L.
By Theorem 1, supt≥0 ‖δ(t)‖ < ∞. Based on the BIBO
stability principle, the stability of X˜(t) in (35) depends on
P . According to [19], the spectrum of P is
σ(P ) =
⋃
λl∈σ(Lg)
{A− λlF}
=
⋃
λl∈σ(Lg)
{
σ
(
1 T
−λlTgs 1− λlTgv
)}
(36)
where σ(·) is the set of distinct eigenvalues.
Let Q =
(
1 T
−λlTgs 1− λlTgv
)
. The eigenvalue of Q,
denoted by s, is the root of the following equation
s2 + (λlTgv − 2)s+ λlT 2gs − λlTgv + 1 = 0. (37)
By [19], all eigenvalues of Lg are positive, i.e., λl > 0.
Under the condition in (26), we have
(λlTgv − 2)2 − 4(λlT 2gs − λlTgv + 1)
=λ2l T
2g2v − 4λlT 2gs
=λlT
2(λlg
2
v − 4gs)
≤λlT 2(λmax(Lg)g2v − 4gs)
<0.
which results in that (37) has two conjugate complex roots.
The two roots share the same modulus in the following |s| =
λlT
2gs − λlTgv + 1. Due to (26) and λl > 0, |s| < 1. The
eigenvalues of Q fall into the open unit disk for each λl.
Therefore, P is Schur stable.
Under Theorem 1, it can be proved that there is a constant
scalar α3 > 0, such that lim sup
t→∞
‖δ(t)‖ ≤ α3. By Lemma
3 and (35), there is a constant scalar α4 > 0, such that
lim sup
t→∞
∥∥∥X˜(t)∥∥∥ ≤ α4, which ensures the conclusion of this
theorem.
E. Useful lemma
Lemma 3: Consider the linear dynamical system x(t +
1) = Fx(t) + G(t), where F ∈ Rn×n is a Schur stable
matrix. Then there is a positive definite matrix P, satisfying
FTPF − P = −In, such that
‖x(t)‖2 ≤λ
tλmax(P ) ‖x(0)‖2
λmin(P )
+
β
λmin(P )
t−1∑
l=0
λt−1−l ‖G(l)‖2 . (38)
where λ = 1− 12λmax(P ) ∈ (0, 1) and β = ‖P‖+ 2 ‖PF‖
2
.
Furthermore,
1) if supt≥0 ‖G(t)‖ ≤ α1, then
lim sup
t→∞
‖x(t)‖2 ≤ βα
2
1
λmin(P )(1− λ) ;
2) if lim sup
t→∞
‖G(t)‖ ≤ α2, then
lim sup
t→∞
‖x(t)‖2 ≤ βα
2
2
λmin(P )(1− λ) .
Proof: First, it can be easily verified that P =∑∞
i=0(F
i)TF i is the solution of FTPF − P = −In with
λmin(P ) ≥ 1. Let V (x(t)) = x(t)TPx(t). Then we consider
V (x(t+ 1))− V (x(t))
=G(t)TPG(t) + 2x(t)TFTPG(t)− x(t)Tx(t)
(a)
≤ ‖P‖ ‖G(t)‖2 − 1
2
x(t)Tx(t) + 2G(t)TPFFTPG(t)
≤β ‖G(t)‖2 − 1
2λmax(P )
V (x(t)), (39)
where (a) is obtained by noting that ( 1√
2
x(t) −√
2FTPG(t))T ( 1√
2
x(t) − √2FTPG(t)) ≥ 0. By (39), we
then have
V (x(t+ 1)) ≤ λV (x(t)) + β ‖G(t)‖2 . (40)
By applying (40) for t times, we have
V (x(t)) ≤ λtV (x(0)) + β
t−1∑
l=0
λt−1−l ‖G(l)‖2 . (41)
The equation (38) is straightforward to be obtained by (41).
The conclusion in 1) is obtained by (38) and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, we prove 2). To prove 2), we just need to prove that
for ∀0 > 0, there is a constant T0 > 0, such that for any
t ≥ T0, ‖x(t)‖2 ≤ βα
2
2
λmin(P )(1−λ) + 0.
Due to lim sup
t→∞
‖G(t)‖ ≤ α2, ∀1 > 0, there is a constant
T1 > 0, such that for any t ≥ T1, ‖G(t)‖ ≤ α2 + 1. Then
we rewrite (38) in the following
‖x(t)‖2 ≤λ
tλmax(P ) ‖x(0)‖2
λmin(P )
+
β
λmin(P )
T1−1∑
l=0
λt−1−l ‖G(l)‖2
+
β
λmin(P )
t−1∑
l=T1
λt−1−l ‖G(l)‖2 . (42)
We analyze the three terms on the right-hand side of (42),
respectively. First, due to λ ∈ (0, 1), there is a time T2 > 0,
such that t ≥ T2,
λtλmax(P ) ‖x(0)‖2
λmin(P )
<
0
3
. (43)
Second, due to supt≥0 ‖G(l)‖2 <∞, there is a time T3 > 0,
such that t ≥ T3,
β
λmin(P )
T1−1∑
l=0
λt−1−l ‖G(l)‖2 < 0
3
. (44)
Finally, recall that ∀1 > 0, ‖G(t)‖ ≤ α2 + 1 for any
t ≥ T1 + 1. By taking 1 < 0λmin(P )(1−λ)3β , we have
β
λmin(P )
t−1∑
l=T1
λt−1−l ‖G(l)‖2
≤β(α2 + 1)
λmin(P )
(1− λt−T1)
1− λ
≤ βα2
λmin(P )(1− λ) +
β1
λmin(P )(1− λ)
<
βα2
λmin(P )(1− λ) +
0
3
. (45)
Let T0 = max{T1 + 1, T2, T3}. Then given ∀0 > 0, for any
t ≥ T0, by (42)–(45), ‖x(t)‖2 ≤ βα
2
2
λmin(P )(1−λ) + 0.
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